



	Harald	A.	Wiltsche	Department	for	Philosophy	University	of	Graz,	Austria	harald.wiltsche@uni-graz.at	www.haraldwiltsche.com		The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	present	an	outline	of	a	phenomenological	theory	of	thought	experiments	 (henceforth:	TEs).	 In	doing	 so,	 I	 am	dealing	with	a	 topic	 that	 is	 currently	starting	 to	 receive	 increased	 attention	 from	 philosophers	 with	 phenomenological	leanings.	 However,	 since	 no	 serious	 attempt	 has	 been	 made	 to	 tackle	 the	 issue	 in	 a	systematic	 fashion,	 I	 will	 not	 merely	 review	 existing	 phenomenological	 work	 on	 TEs	(such	as	Mohanty	1991;	Kunjundzic	1995;	Froese	&	Gallagher	2010;	Fehige	&	Wiltsche	2013;	Wiltsche	2013;	Hopp	2014).	For	the	most	part,	my	paper	is	programmatic:	its	aim	is	to	suggest	some	basic	directions	in	which	a	phenomenological	theory	of	TEs	should	be	developed.		The	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 I	 will	 begin	 by	 saying	 a	 word	 or	 two	 on	 what	phenomenology	is	and	on	why	I	believe	that	it	can	contribute	to	the	ongoing	debate	on	TEs.	I	shall	then	introduce	five	phenomenological	concepts	that	will	prove	crucial	for	an	understanding	 of	 TE-reasoning:	 fulfillment,	 frustration,	 horizon,	 anticipation	 and	
background	 knowledge.	 My	 strategy	 is	 to	 first	 give	 a	 brief	 sketch	 of	 how	 knowledge	acquisition	works	 in	 the	 perceptual	 realm.	 It	 is	 against	 this	 backdrop	 that	 I	will	 then	outline	how	knowledge	is	generated	in	the	realm	of	TE-reasoning.	It	is	one	of	my	main	theses	that	TEs	should	be	understood	as	anticipation	pumps.		Before	I	begin,	however,	two	qualifying	remarks	are	in	order.	The	first	concerns	my	use	of	the	term	“phenomenology”:	Just	as	there	is	more	than	one	analytic	method,	there	is	no	general	 agreement	 within	 the	 phenomenological	 community	 on	 what	 the	phenomenological	 method	 precisely	 is.	 It	 is	 thus	 important	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 that	 the	following	portrayal	of	phenomenology	reflects	my	own	background	in	(a	liberal	reading	of)	Edmund	Husserl’s	philosophy.	Secondly,	much	of	what	I	will	have	to	say	about	TEs	concerns	 TE-reasoning	 in	 science	 and	 not	 TE-reasoning	 in	 philosophy.	 To	 a	 certain	extent,	 this	 limitation	 again	 reflects	my	own	background	 in	 the	philosophy	of	 science.	However,	since	I	believe	that	scientific	and	philosophical	TEs	differ	only	 in	degree	and	not	 in	 kind,	 I	 am	 confident	 that	 the	 proposed	 framework	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 non-scientific	TEs.		
1. Getting	Phenomenology	off	the	Ground		When	 phenomenology	 entered	 the	 philosophical	 stage	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 Neo-Kantianism	was	still	in	full	swing.	Otto	Liebmann	had	coined	the	unifying	motto	“Back	to	Kant!”	 under	 which	 the	 Neo-Kantians	 sought	 to	 overcome	 the	 dispute	 between	materialism	 and	 idealism	 that	 had	 dominated	much	 of	 the	 philosophical	 discourse	 in	Germany	and	Austria	up	until	 the	mid-19th	 century.	 It	was	against	 this	motto	 that	 the	first	 generation	 of	 phenomenologists	 directed	 their	 own	 slogan	 “Back	 to	 the	 things	
themselves!”.	 Yet,	 it	wasn't	 particularly	 Kant	 of	whom	Husserl	 and	 his	 followers	were	critical.	The	first	wave	of	phenomenologists	disapproved	of	any	kind	of	philosophy	that	
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looks	 at	 its	 problems	 through	 the	 glasses	 of	 pre-established	 theories,	 systems	 or	schemes.	 Instead	 of	 forcing	 problems	 into	 a	 particular	 (and	 potentially	 artificial)	theoretical	mould,	phenomenologists	were	 (and	still	 are)	driven	by	a	deep	respect	 for	the	 phenomena,	 i.e.	 the	 things	 exactly	 as	 they	 are	 given	 in	 experience.	 On	 a	phenomenological	view,	many	philosophical	problems	could	be	solved	–	or	even	better:	made	 to	 evaporate	 –	 if	 we	 resisted	 the	 temptation	 to	 interfere	 with	 ready-made	theoretical	schemes	and	put	more	effort	in	a	faithful	description	of	the	phenomena.			Paradigmatic	 for	 this	approach	 is	Husserl’s	sixth	Logical	 Investigation	(Husserl	2001b,	177-348):	The	aim	of	this	book-length	treatise	is	to	tackle	one	of	the	most	fundamental	issues	 in	 philosophy,	 namely	 to	 understand	 the	 concepts	 “truth”,	 “knowledge”	 and	“knowledge	acquisition”,	as	well	as	the	relations	between	them.	On	Husserl’s	view,	the	trouble	with	many	existing	approaches	to	 this	 issue	 is	 that	 they	are	 infected	with	pre-established	theoretical	schemes	already	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 formulation	of	 the	problem.	For	instance,	a	common	way	to	start	is	to	ask	how	a	self-enclosed	subject	is	able	to	reach	the	external	world	in	order	to	attain	justified	true	beliefs	about	reality	by	relying	on	acts	of	 visual,	 auditory	 or	 olfactory	 perception.	 However,	 built	 into	 this	 question	 are	 a	number	of	 far-reaching	assumptions	such	as	common-sense	realism	or	the	view	that	a	gap	between	the	interiority	of	the	mental	and	the	exteriority	of	the	world	in	fact	exists.	Husserl	 accepts	 that	 these	 and	 similar	 other	 assumptions	 may	 be	 useful	 or,	 in	 some	cases,	even	indispensable	in	certain	practical	contexts.	Yet,	since	the	job	of	philosophy	is	not	 to	 simply	adopt	 existing	assumptions,	 but	 rather	 to	 scrutinize	 them,	philosophical	analysis	 must	 proceed	 from	 a	 standpoint	 that	 is	 not	 already	 contaminated	 with	 pre-established	theoretical	schemes.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	Husserl	actively	“brackets”1	all	kinds	 of	 metaphysical,	 scientific	 and	 commonsensical	 assumptions	 and	 starts	 with	 a	careful	and	unbiased	description	of	the	types	of	conscious	experiences	in	which	different	types	of	objects	become	present	 from	a	 first-person	point	of	view.	To	be	sure,	nothing	prevents	the	phenomenologist	from	eventually	taking	sides	in	traditional	metaphysical	disputes	 about,	 say,	 dualism,	 realism	 or	 physicalism.	 But	 whatever	 she	 will	 end	 up	saying	on	such	matters	must	result	from	a	description	of	the	phenomena	and	not	from	the	mere	stipulation	of	basic	maxims	or	principles.		As	 I	 have	 pointed	 out,	 phenomenologists	 are	 driven	 by	 a	 deep	 respect	 for	 the	phenomena,	i.e.	for	the	things	as	they	appear	in	conscious	experience.	This	general	tenet	–	which,	 in	my	view,	 captures	much	of	what	makes	a	phenomenological	 account	 truly	phenomenological2	–	 also	 yields	 important	 consequences	 for	 how	 phenomenologists																																																									1	The	notion	of	“bracketing”	comes	from	Husserl’s	mathematical	background,	specifically	from	the	concept	of	absolute	value	(the	notation	“|x|”	was	introduced	by	Husserl’s	teacher	Karl	Weierstrass).	The	absolute	value	|x|	of	a	real	number	x	is	the	non-negative	value	of	x	without	regard	to	its	sign.	So,	for	instance,	3	and	-3	have	the	same	absolute	value	3.	Hence,	to	bracket	a	natural	number	means	to	be	indifferent	with	regard	to	a	number’s	property	of	being	positive	or	negative	and	to	focus	on	its	magnitude	instead.	Accordingly,	to	bracket	 assumptions	neither	means	 to	 endorse,	 nor	 to	deny	 them.	 It	merely	means	 to	 focus	on	what	 is	given	independently	from	all	assuming.	2	It	 should	 be	 emphasized	 that	 it	 is	 mainly	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity	 that	 I	 am	 working	 with	 a	 rather	restricted	 conception	 of	 phenomenology	 here.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 I	 am	 conceiving	 of	 the	phenomenological	method	 roughly	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 Charles	 Siewert’s	 “plain	 phenomenology”.	 On	 this	view,	 one	 is	 doing	 phenomenology	 if	 (1)	 one	 explains	 mental	 distinctions,	 if	 (2)	 one	 shows	 how	 such	explanations	 have	 significant	 theoretical	 consequences,	 if	 (3)	 one’s	 explanations	 relies	 on	 a	 source	 of	warrant	 special	 to	 some	 first-person	 applications	 of	 the	 distinctions	 explained	 and	 if	 (4)	 one	 does	 not	assume	that	such	first-person	warrant	as	one	relies	on	is	derived	from	third-person	evidence	(cf.	Siewert	2007,	 202).	However,	 I’d	 also	 like	 to	 stress	 that	 this	 understanding	 of	 phenomenology	does	not	 do	 full	justice	 to	 the	 all	 the	 subtleties	 of	 Husserl’s	 account.	 Readers	 interested	 in	 a	 more	 comprehensive	
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should	approach	the	issue	of	scientific	TEs.	Let	me	begin	by	briefly	summarizing	how	the	discussion	is	usually	framed:	It	is	beyond	dispute	that	TEs	are	part	of	scientific	practice	in	core	disciplines	such	as	physics	or	biology.	Most	commentators	also	agree	that	at	least	some	scientific	TEs	are	successful	 in	generating	knowledge	about	 the	empirical	world.	But	how	 is	 this	possible?	Since,	by	definition,	 they	are	experiments	 in	thought,	TEs	do	not	seem	to	establish	direct	cognitive	contact	with	the	world.	This	makes	the	success	of	TEs	indeed	puzzling:	How	can	we	learn	something	about	the	world	by	merely	thinking	about	 it?	 It	 has	 become	 common	 to	 refer	 to	 this	 question	 as	 the	 paradox	 of	 TEs	 (c.f.	Horowitz	&	Massey	1991,	1).			Much	 of	 the	 contemporary	 discussion	 about	 scientific	 TEs	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 task	 of	solving	this	paradox.	Hence,	the	existence	of	apparently	successful	TEs	is	usually	treated	as	the	explanandum	to	which	suitable	theoretical	explanations	are	directed.	On	one	such	theory,	the	success	of	(some)	TEs	is	explained	by	means	of	a	Platonist	construal	of	the	laws	of	nature	and	by	the	ancillary	epistemological	thesis	that	TEs	allow	us	to	directly	grasp	these	laws	with	our	mind’s	eye	(e.g.	Brown	2004,	2011).	Another	theory	explains	the	success	of	TEs	by	declaring	them	to	be	arguments	in	disguise.	On	this	view,	scientific	TEs	 lead	 us	 to	 knowledge	 because	 they	 are,	 in	 reality,	 chains	 of	 inductive	 and/or	deductive	inferences	(e.g.	Norton	1996,	2004).	On	a	third	popular	account,	the	success	of	TEs	 is	 explained	 by	 means	 of	 a	 psychological	 theory	 according	 to	 which	 the	manipulation	 of	mental	models	 allows	 us	 to	 trigger	 knowledge	 formations	 that	 aren’t	cognitively	available	otherwise	(e.g.	Miščević	1992,	Nersessian	1993).		A	good	deal	of	ink	has	been	spilled	over	these	proposals	and	I	will	add	to	this	discussion	below.	For	 the	moment,	however,	 I	want	 to	emphasize	 that	much	of	 the	plausibility	of	each	of	 these	 theories	depends	on	quite	substantial	metaphysical,	 epistemological	and	ontological	 assumptions	 whose	 scope	 goes	 well	 beyond	 their	 actual	 subject	 matter.	Take,	 for	 instance,	Platonism:	The	plausibility	of	a	Platonist	explanation	of	TEs	 largely	depends	 on	 our	 willingness	 to	 accept	 a	 rationalist	 epistemology,	 an	 ontology	 that	includes	 universals	 and	 the	 view	 that	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	 contingent	 necessitation	relations	 between	 universal	 properties.	 If	 one	 accepts	 these	 assumptions,	 then	Platonism	is	a	perfectly	good	explanation	for	the	existence	of	TEs	 in	science	history	as	well	 as	 of	 their	 apparent	 success.	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 one	 thinks	 that	we	 should	 be	parsimonious	in	ontological	and	metaphysical	matters	and	that	sense	perception	is	the	only	 source	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	 world,	 then	 one	 will	 likely	 opt	 for	 one	 of	 the	empiricist	alternatives	 to	Platonism.	Hence,	although	 it	would	be	 too	strong	of	a	claim	that	the	available	theories	on	TEs	are	evaluated	only	on	the	basis	of	their	commitments	to	certain	metaphysical	and	epistemological	stances,	 it	 is	at	 least	safe	to	say	that	these	commitments	 play	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 how	 the	 discussion	 normally	 evolves.	 And,	supposedly,	 it	 is	 also	 due	 to	 these	 commitments	 that	 certain	 strands	 of	 the	contemporary	debate	on	TEs	appear	to	be	a	mere	sideline	of	the	age-old	battle	between	rationalism	and	empiricism.		Now,	my	point	is	not	to	deny	that	the	TE-debate	may	have	implications	for	the	quarrel	between	rationalists	and	empiricists.	Since	it	is	at	least	initially	plausible	to	regard	TEs	as	prima	facie	cases	of	knowledge	acquisition	minus	sense	perception,	the	onus	seems	to	be	on	philosophers	with	empiricist	leanings	to	come	up	with	a	deflationary	account	on	TE-reasoning.	Rather,	my	point	 is	 that,	 if	we	wish	 to	address	TEs	phenomenologically,																																																																																																																																																																														treatment	 may	 either	 refer	 to	 Crowell	 (2006)	 for	 a	 highly	 instructive	 introductory	 essay	 or	 to	 Smith	(2007)	for	a	more	detailed,	book-length	study.	
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the	 issue	 should	 be	 approached	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 not	 already	 contaminated	with	 pre-established	 assumptions	 concerning	 metaphysical,	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	matters.	 To	 construct	 one’s	 theory	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 either	 rationalist	 or	 empiricist	intuitions	 not	 only	 clashes	 with	 the	 phenomenological	 demand	 to	 proceed	 from	 an	unbiased	 description	 of	 the	 phenomena;	 it	 also	 harbours	 the	 danger	 of	 begging	 the	question	 against	 the	 respective	 opponent,	 of	 distorting	 the	 subject	 matter	 before	 the	actual	analysis	can	even	begin	and	of	ending	up	 in	a	stalemate	between	 irreconcilable	epistemological	and	metaphysical	systems.		Hence,	what	sets	phenomenology	apart	from	other	theoretical	alternatives	is,	first	of	all,	its	 point	 of	 departure:	 Instead	 of	 treating	 TEs	 as	 explananda	 that	 call	 for	 theoretical	explanations	whose	credibility	depends	on	more	general	metaphysical,	ontological	and	epistemological	 intuitions,	 phenomenology	 actively	 brackets	 such	 intuitions	 and	proceeds	 from	an	unbiased	description	of	 the	phenomenon	of	TE-reasoning	 instead.	 In	other	words:	The	main	objective,	at	least	at	the	initial	stage,	is	not	to	construct	a	theory	that	 seeks	 to	 bring	 TEs	 in	 line	 with	 certain	 pre-established	 standpoints.	 The	 main	objective	 of	 a	 phenomenological	 account	 is	 rather	 to	 give	 a	 faithful	 description	 of	 the	
actual	performance	of	TEs	from	a	first-person	perspective	and	to	go	on	from	there.		
2. Filling	Up	the	Phenomenological	Toolbox		As	I	have	pointed	out,	phenomenology	differs	from	other	theories	in	its	basic	approach:	A	phenomenological	account	on	TEs	brackets	all	kinds	of	metaphysical,	epistemological	and	scientific	assumptions	and	proceeds	from	a	faithful	description	of	the	phenomenon	of	TE-reasoning.	However,	what	does	this	mean	exactly?	Where	do	we	have	to	start	if	we	wish	to	describe	the	performance	of	TE-reasoning	from	a	first-person	perceptive?	How	do	we	identify	certain	mental	episodes	as	TEs?	And	how	could	we	possibly	tell	if	these	mental	episodes	embody	instances	of	successful	knowledge	acquisition?		In	the	face	of	these	questions,	my	strategy	in	the	remaining	parts	of	this	paper	will	be	as	follows:	 Since	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	 question	 of	whether	 TEs	 fall	 under	 the	 rubric	 of	successful	knowledge	acquisition,	I	will	have	to	say	a	few	words	on	a	phenomenological	theory	 of	 knowledge	 first.	 It	 is	mainly	 through	 the	 discussion	 of	 examples	 that	 I	 will	introduce	 five	 concepts	 that	 are	 crucial	 for	 a	 phenomenological	 understanding	 of	knowledge	 acquisition	 in	 the	 perceptual	 realm.	 These	 concepts	 will	 form	 the	background	against	which	I	will	then	take	a	closer	look	at	the	imagination,3	the	medium	in	 which	 TEs	 are	 performed.	 My	 aim	 is	 to	 highlight	 the	 similarities	 as	 well	 as	 the	differences	between	perception	and	imagination	in	order	to	elucidate	how	knowledge	is	generated	through	the	use	of	TEs.																																																													3	“Imagination”	is	an	umbrella	term	that	is	notoriously	hard	to	define	(cf.	e.g.	Kind	2013).	In	what	follows,	I	will	 take	 it	 to	 denote	 a	 type	 of	mental	 event	 in	which	we	 are	 intentionally	 directed	 towards	 imagined	objects	or	scenarios	and	not,	for	instance,	towards	propositions.	Hence,	I	am	distinguishing	between	acts	of	 imagining	 (in	which	 imagined	objects	 or	 scenarios	 are	 given	 in	 a	 quasi-sensory	manner)	 and	 acts	 of	conceiving	 (in	 which	 the	 objects	 of	 our	 intentional	 directedness	 are	 propositions).	 It	 should	 be	 noted,	however,	that	my	terminology	departs	from	Husserl’s	who	uses	the	notion	“phantasy”	in	order	to	denote	what	I	call	“imagination”.	
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2.1 Fulfillment	and	Frustration		What	 is	 knowledge?	 When	 are	 we	 dealing	 with	 cases	 of	 successful	 knowledge	acquisition?	In	line	with	the	general	tenets	of	the	phenomenological	research	program,	these	 questions,	 too,	 are	 to	 be	 answered	 by	 way	 of	 a	 description	 of	 those	 types	 of	conscious	 experience	 in	 which	 the	 relevant	 distinctions	 become	 evident.	 Take	 the	following	two	cases	as	a	starting	point:	1)	I	am	judging	that	my	bike	is	in	the	office	while	I	am	still	in	the	cafeteria.	2)	I	am	judging	that	my	bike	is	in	the	office	while	I	am	standing	right	in	front	of	it.	Phenomenologically	construed,	these	two	cases	have	a	lot	in	common.	To	begin	with,	both	experiences	are	experiences	of	the	same	type,	namely	experiences	of	judging	(in	contrast	to	experiences	of	doubting,	imagining,	fearing	etc.).	In	addition,	both	experiences	 also	 have	 the	 same	 intentional	 object,	 namely	my	 bike	 in	 the	 office.	 But,	clearly,	 there	 is	 a	 striking	 difference	 as	 well:	 While	 the	 judgement	 about	 my	 bike’s	whereabouts	may	 just	 be	 a	wild	 guess	 as	 long	 as	 I	 am	 still	 in	 the	 cafeteria,	 the	 direct	acquaintance	with	my	bike	(i.e.	my	standing	right	in	front	of	it)	warrants	the	judgement	about	my	bike’s	location	beyond	all	reasonable	doubt.			The	 acknowledgement	 of	 this	 difference	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 a	 first	 step	 towards	 the	notion	of	fulfillment,	one	of	the	main	pillars	of	phenomenological	epistemology:	If	–	like	in	 the	 first	 case	 –	 I	 am	 directed	 towards	 an	 object	 in	 its	 absence,	 then	my	 intention	towards	the	object	is	empty.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	I	am	directed	towards	an	object	in	its	actual	presence	–	 if	 the	object	 is	given	 in	 its	 “‘bodily’	 selfhood”	 (leibhaftige	Selbstheit)	(Husserl	1983,	pp.	9-10;	translation	modified)	–,	then	my	intention	towards	the	object	is	
fulfilled	by	the	presence	of	that	very	object.	Fulfillment,	i.e.	the	congruence	between	the	object	as	it	is	emptily	intended	and	the	object	as	it	is	intuitively	given,	is	the	ideal	limit	towards	which	our	judging	strives,	“the	measure	of	its	success	or	failure”	(Crowell	2006,	14).	If	this	kind	of	congruence	not	only	takes	place,	but	is	also	registered	by	a	cognizing	subject,	then	we	are	dealing	with	what	Walter	Hopp	aptly	calls	“knowledge	at	its	best”	(Hopp	2011,	chapter	7).4		Let	me	summarize:	Fulfillment	takes	place	 if	 there	 is	a	relation	of	congruence	between	an	object	 as	 it	 is	 emptily	 intended	and	 the	object	 as	 it	 is	 intuitively	given.	Conversely,	
frustration	occurs	when	the	intuitive	experience	of	an	object	is	non-congruent	with	the	empty	 intention	 towards	 that	same	object.	 In	an	 ideal	case	of	 fulfillment,	 I	 realize	 that	the	object	is	exactly	like	I	thought	it	would	be.	In	cases	of	frustration,	the	intended	object	turns	 out	 to	 be	 different	 than	 initially	 thought.	 On	 a	 phenomenological	 view,	 all	epistemic	concepts	such	as	evidence,	justification	or	falsification	ultimately	lead	back	to	the	basic	concepts	of	fulfillment	and	frustration.		
2.2 Horizon	and	Anticipation		The	 concepts	 of	 fulfillment	 and	 frustration	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 phenomenological	understanding	of	knowledge	and	knowledge	acquisition.	Fulfillment,	i.e.	the	congruence																																																									4	It	must	be	noted	that	the	concept	of	fulfillment	is	not	restricted	to	the	realm	of	perceptual	experiences.	Although	it	is	true	that	veridical	perceptions	are	model	cases	of	fulfillment	(cf.	e.g.	Husserl	1983,	5-6,	82-83,	154,	327),	fulfillment	is	a	functional	concept	that	goes	along	with	a	functional	object	concept.	This	is	to	say	 that	 fulfillment	 takes	place	whenever	an	empty	 intention	 towards	an	object	 is	 in	congruence	with	a	fulfilling	 intention	 towards	 the	 same	 object.	 However,	 as	 Husserl	 makes	 clear,	 “an	 object	 […]	 may	 as	readily	be	what	is	real	as	what	is	ideal,	a	thing	or	an	event	or	a	species	of	a	mathematical	relation,	a	case	of	being	or	a	what	ought	to	be”	(Husserl	2001a,	p.	145).	
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between	an	object-as-intended	and	the	object-as-given,	is	the	ideal	limit	to	which	all	of	our	 knowledge-claims	 aspire.	On	 closer	 inspection,	 however,	 this	 turns	out	 to	be	 only	part	of	the	story,	especially	–	but	not	only	–	with	respect	to	the	acquisition	of	empirical	knowledge.	Consider	again	 the	example	of	 the	veridical	perception	of	my	bike.	At	 first	glance,	the	direct	perceptual	givenness	of	my	bike	seems	to	clearly	fulfill	the	judgment	that	my	bike	is	in	the	office.	But	a	more	accurate	description	reveals	that	what	is	really	experientially	given	in	this	situation	is	not	simply	my	bike,	but	only	one	single	profile	of	
my	bike,	its	current	front	side.	To	be	sure,	I	could	alter	my	position	and	make	the	current	backside	the	new	front	side,	and	vice	versa.	But	this	doesn’t	change	the	fact	that	my	bike	is	always	given	 in	perspectives	 and	 that,	more	generally,	 things	always	and	necessarily	have	more	parts,	functions	and	properties	than	can	be	actualized	in	a	single	intentional	act.	My	bike	–	as	it	is	intended	–	is	transcendent,	not	only	in	the	sense	that	it	can	be	seen	from	indefinitely	many	more	perspectives	than	I	can	take	up	at	a	given	point	in	time.	It	is	also	 transcendent	 in	 the	sense	 that	 it	has,	 for	 instance,	a	momentarily	hidden	 internal	structure,	 a	 history,	 certain	 practical	 functions	 or	 many	 properties	 that	 aren’t	 in	 the	center	of	attention	right	now.		So,	a	 closer	 look	at	how	things	appear	 to	us	 reveals	 that	our	 intentions	 towards	 these	things	always	“transcend”	or	“go	beyond”	the	actual	experiences	that	give	rise	to	them.	As	 the	example	of	my	bike	shows,	 there	 is	a	describable	discrepancy	between	what	 is	meant	 through	 a	 particular	 intentional	 act	 (my	 bike	 over	 there)	 and	 what	 is	experientially	 given	 (my	 bike’s	 facing	 side	 with	 its	 momentarily	 visible	 features).	Phenomenologically	construed,	this	discrepancy	does	not	represent	a	problem	that	must	be	 somehow	 remedied,	 e.g.	 by	 proposing	 a	 theory	 that	 explains	 how	 a	 number	 of	seemingly	 disconnected	 profiles	 add	 up	 to	 a	 homogeneous	 thing	 to	 which	 we	 then	attribute	these	profiles.	The	fact	that	our	intentions	towards	things	always	transcend	the	sphere	 of	 intuitive	 givenness	 is	 rather	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 phenomenologically	discoverable	 feature	 of	 experience	 itself:	 Intending	 is,	 as	 Husserl	 puts	 it,	 always	 and	necessarily	 an	 “intending-beyond-itself”	 (Husserl	 1960,	 46).	 In	 being	 intentionally	directed	towards	material	things,	we	“know”	that	there	is	more	to	them	than	is	revealed	in	one	single	glance.	This	“knowing”	is	no	matter	of	inferential	belief	or	judgement	over	and	 above	 the	 experiences	 in	 which	 things	 are	 perspectivally	 given;	 it	 is	 rather	 an	essential	part	of	any	such	experience.		The	 important	 lesson	 to	 draw	 from	 these	 considerations	 is	 that	 “[e]ach	 individual	percept	 is	a	mixture	of	 fulfilled	and	unfulfilled	intentions”	(Husserl	2001b,	221).	Or,	to	put	 it	 in	 an	 alternative	 terminology:	 Intentional	 experiences	 are	 always	 embedded	 in	implicit	horizons	of	intentions	that	are	momentarily	unfulfilled,	but	that	could	be	fulfilled	in	the	course	of	further	acts.	Even	though	I	can	now	only	see	my	bike’s	facing	side	with	its	 momentarily	 visible	 features,	 my	 bike	 appears	 to	 me	 as	 something	 that	 could	 be	explored	 more	 fully.	 I	 “know”	 that	 I	 could	 alter	 my	 vantage	 point	 and	 explore	 its	momentarily	hidden	back	side.	 I	 “know”	that	 I	could	 look	more	closely	and	explore	 its	surface	in	more	detail.	I	“know”	that	I	could	cut	the	frame	in	half	and	explore	its	internal	structure.	It	is	these	and	indefinitely	many	other	potentialities	that	add	up	to	the	implicit	horizon	 against	 the	 background	 of	 which	 singular	 intentions	 towards	 things	 always	stand	out.		Phenomenological	descriptions	reveal	that	intentional	acts	towards	things	always	point	to	implicit	horizons	of	empty	intentions.	Hence,	on	a	phenomenological	view,	experience	is	 never	 exhausted	 by	 what	 is	 actual;	 experience	 is	 always	 already	 saturated	 with	
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implicit	 references	 to	 future	 experiences	 that	 are	 possible	 insofar	 as	 they	 could	 be	actualized	 in	 the	 course	 of	 further	 acts.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 more	 complete	understanding	of	the	phenomenological	notion	of	horizon,	two	more	aspects	have	to	be	stressed:	The	 first	 thing	 to	note	 is	 that	an	act’s	horizon	 is,	as	 I	have	already	 indicated,	
implicit	to	the	act	itself.	This	is	to	say	that	the	horizon	is	no	theoretical	construct	that	is	
retrospectively	ascribed	 to	 the	 initial	 act.	 An	 act’s	 horizon	 is	 rather	 co-given	with	 the	initial	act	even	though	we	usually	aren’t	aware	of	this.	That	my	bike	has	a	backside	isn’t	something	that	can	only	be	asserted	after	I	have	changed	my	vantage	point.	It	is	also	not	something	that	is	the	product	of	some	sort	of	inferential	process.	Rather,	it	is	something	that	belongs	to	the	very	meaning	of	being	intentionally	directed	towards	material	things.		The	second	important	aspect	 is	this:	On	the	basis	of	what	I	have	said	so	far,	one	could	define	horizons	as	sets	of	empty	intentions	against	the	background	of	which	particular	fulfilled	 intentions	 always	 and	 necessarily	 stand	 out.	 But	 this	 definition	 is	 somewhat	misleading:	Although	it	is	correct	to	say	that	a	horizon	consists	of	empty	intentions	and	thus	can	be	described	as	a	“halo	of	emptiness”,	it	is	crucial	to	stress	that	“this	emptiness	is	 not	 a	 nothingness”,	 but	 rather	 that	 “the	 sense	 of	 this	 halo	 […]	 is	 a	prefiguring	 that	
prescribes	a	rule	for	the	transition	to	new	actualizing	appearances”	(Husserl	2001c,	42;	my	emphases).	What	Husserl	is	saying	here	can	be	elucidated	with	the	help	of	my	earlier	example:	If	I	perceive	my	bike,	my	intention	towards	the	bike’s	facing	side	is	conjoined	with	a	horizon	of	empty	intentions	and	thus	with	the	anticipation	that	there	is	more	to	the	 bike	 than	 is	 revealed	 in	 one	 single	 act.	 However,	 this	 more	 is	 far	 from	 being	indeterminate:	 In	 perceiving	 my	 bike,	 I	 implicitly	 anticipate	 concrete	 courses	 of	experiences	 that	 are	 compatible	with	what	was	originally	 intended.	The	perception	of	the	 greyish	 blue	 of	 my	 bike’s	 facing	 side,	 for	 instance,	 comes	 with	 the	 implicit	anticipation	that	the	momentarily	hidden	backside	will	exhibit	the	same	color	as	well.	To	be	sure,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 this	anticipation	 is	 frustrated	by	 future	experiences.	But	 if	 I	were	 to	 find	out	 that	my	bike’s	backside	 isn’t	 greyish	blue,	 but	 coated	with	diamonds	and	rubies,	then	I	would	probably	start	to	wonder	whether	I	am	really	dealing	with	my	bike	at	all.		So,	 typically,	horizons	are	not	 indeterminate	in	the	sense	that	a	given	act	points	to	the	entirety	 of	 acts	 that	 are	 logically	 compatible	 with	 the	 initial	 act.	 Horizons	 are	 rather	
structured:	 they	 prescribe	 implicit	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 that	 restrict	 how	 things	 could	appear	if	the	corresponding	experiences	were	still	to	qualify	as	experiences	of	the	same	thing.			
2.3 Background	Knowledge	
	The	point	of	the	previous	considerations	is	that	our	experience	of	things	is	“thoroughly	interwoven	with	anticipations”	(Husserl	2001c,	47).	Things	are	always	and	necessarily	given	 in	horizons	and	 these	horizons	prescribe	 rules	 through	which	we	anticipate	 the	course	of	 future	experiences.	Under	normal	circumstances,	 these	rules	remain	 implicit	and	 largely	 unnoticed.	 It	 is	 mainly	 in	 cases	 of	 frustrated	 anticipations	 that	 their	existence	even	becomes	manifest.5																																																										5	Here	 is	 an	 example	 that	 illustrates	 the	 issue:	 Imagine	 you	 are	 asked	 to	 bring	 a	 shopping	 bag	 into	 the	kitchen.	You	go	to	the	car,	you	see	the	bag	in	the	trunk,	you	get	ready	to	lift	it	and	–	Oops!	–	your	arms	go	up	way	 too	easy	and	you	almost	 topple	over.	What	happened?	Well,	 the	bag	 is	significantly	 lighter	 than	you	anticipated	because	it	is	filled	with	paper	towels.	What	is	remarkable	about	this	case	is,	first	of	all,	the	funny	 feeling	 that	 you	 had	when	 you	 lifted	 the	 bag.	 Since	 you	 have	 lifted	many	 light	 items	 before,	 this	
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	Given	the	view	outlined	so	far,	an	obvious	question	arises:	Where	do	the	aforementioned	anticipations	come	 from?	How	are	 they	generated?	And	what	 is	 their	status?	As	David	Woodruff	Smith	and	Ronald	McIntyre	have	pointed	out	(Smith	&	McIntyre	1982,	chapter	5;	 Smith	 2004,	 chapter	 5),	 both	 horizons	 and	 the	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 that	 are	 given	through	them	are	dependent	on	highly	heterogeneous	stocks	of	background	knowledge	that,	in	their	totality,	make	up	our	fundamental	background	image	of	the	world.	In	large	part,	this	background	knowledge	is	empirical	and	thus	highly	contingent	in	nature.	Just	think	of	the	earlier	example	of	my	anticipation	that	my	bike’s	backside	will	exhibit	the	same	 color	 as	 its	 facing	 side:	Clearly,	my	anticipation	 in	 this	 case	depends	on	 the	 fact	that	 I’ve	had	 countless	previous	encounters	with	my	bike.	Hence,	 a	more	determinate	horizon	with	more	determinate	anticipations	is	co-given	with	my	experiences	of	my	bike	than	would	be	co-given	with	your	experiences	of	my	bike.			Other	parts	of	our	background	knowledge	are	not	empirical,	but	 theoretical	 in	nature:	Psychologists	 conducted	 experiments	 in	 which	 students	 were	 asked	 to	 observe	 the	falling	of	two	objects	(a	metal	sphere	and	a	plastic	sphere	of	the	same	diameter)	and	to	record	 their	 observations	 (Gunstone	 &	White	 1981).	 Students	 who	 initially	 held	 that	heavier	objects	fall	faster	were	much	more	likely	to	report	observations	that	supported	their	theory.	Experiments	such	as	these	suggest	that	our	anticipations	of	further	courses	of	 experience	 are	 sometimes	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 theoretical	 components	 of	 our	background	knowledge.		Finally,	 as	 phenomenologists	 typically	 stress,	 there	 is	 a	 third	 type	 of	 background	knowledge	 that	 belongs	 to	 neither	 of	 the	 two	 aforementioned	 categories:	 Take,	 for	instance,	the	anticipation	that	my	bike	will	exhibit,	not	a	particular	color	on	its	backside,	
but	rather	some	kind	of	rear	side	at	all.	Since	we	fail	to	even	imagine	a	material	thing	that	does	not	exhibit	a	backside	of	some	sort,	phenomenologists	claim	that	the	corresponding	anticipation	is	not	governed	by	a	contingent	piece	of	background	knowledge;	it	is	rather	governed	by	a	“necessary	la[w]	which	determine[s]	what	must	necessarily	belong	to	an	object	in	order	that	it	can	be	an	object	of	this	kind”	(Husserl	1973,	352).	That	material	things,	 unlike,	 say,	 geometrical	 objects,	 are	 necessarily	 given	 in	 perspectives	 is	determined	by	“a	universal	essence	which	[…]	prescribes	an	intellectually	seen	generical	
rule	for	every	particular	object	becoming	intended	to	in	multiplicities	of	concrete	mental	processes”	(Husserl	1983,	341).		
3. Perception	and	Imagination:	The	Return	of	the	Paradox		My	approach	in	the	previous	sections	was	to	use	examples	from	the	perceptual	sphere	in	order	 to	 introduce	 five	 phenomenological	 key	 concepts.	 Yet,	 on	 closer	 inspection,	 the	applicability	 of	 these	 concepts	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 the	 perceptual	 realm.	 Consider,	 for	example,	 “horizon”	 and	 “anticipation”:	 As	 I	 have	 pointed	 out,	 material	 things	 are	necessarily	given	in	horizons	through	which	we	anticipate	further	courses	of	experience.	Horizontal	givenness,	however,	is	by	no	means	exclusive	to	perception:	“Imaginings	[…]	present	 their	 objects	within	 exactly	 the	 same	horizons”	 (Husserl	 1973,	 169).	 Imagine,																																																																																																																																																																														feeling	 is	 certainly	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 you	 lifted	 something	 light.	 What	 makes	 the	experience	stand	out	is	rather	how	it	compared	to	your	(frustrated)	anticipations.	What	is	more,	cases	like	these	 also	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	many	 of	 our	 anticipations	 correspond	 to	 pieces	 of	 non-propositional,	practical	and	sensorimotor	knowledge	about	how	things	are	done	and	how	we	use	our	bodies	to	do	them	(cf.,	e.g.,	Husserl	1997;	Noë	2004).	
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for	 instance,	Bart	Simpson	writing	 “No	one	cares	what	my	definition	of	 ‘is’	 is”	on	Mrs.	Krabappel’s	 blackboard.	 If	 you	 do	 so,	 then	 the	 object	 of	 your	 attention	 is	 a	 yellow	cartoon	 character	 that	 is	 scribbling	 on	 a	 blackboard.	 Yet,	 co-given	 with	 this	 initial	experience	is	a	set	of	empty	intentions	through	which	you	anticipate	further	features	of	the	 imagined	 scenario.	Although	 they	aren’t	 in	 the	 centre	of	 your	attention	 right	 from	the	 start,	 you	 automatically	 anticipate	 further	 features	 such	 as	 the	 spikiness	 of	 Bart’s	hair,	the	wall	behind	the	blackboard	or	the	color	of	Bart’s	pants.	If	the	focus	of	attention	shifts	and	objects	from	the	margin	move	to	the	centre,	certain	other	objects	fade	into	the	background,	without,	however,	disappearing	completely.	Like	in	the	previous	examples	from	the	perceptual	sphere,	you	“know”	that	there	is	more	to	the	imagined	objects	than	can	be	grasped	in	one	single	act.		Horizontal	givenness	is	not	the	only	commonality	between	perception	and	imagination.	Remember	the	crucial	distinction	between	empty	and	fulfilled	intentions:	If	I	am	merely	thinking	of	my	bike,	then	my	intention	towards	my	bike	is	empty.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	I	perceive	my	bike,	my	intention	towards	the	intended	thing	is	intuitively	fulfilled	by	the	thing’s	 presence.	 But	 is	 perception	 the	 only	 means	 by	 which	 the	 empty	 intention	towards	my	bike	can	be	fulfilled?	Not	at	all.	If	I	imagine	my	bike,	then	this,	too,	fulfills	the	mere	thought	of	my	bike	–	what	was	empty	before	(the	bike	as	the	object	of	my	thought)	is	 now	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 quasi-experience	 of	 my	 imagined	 bike.	 Hence,	 perception	 and	imagination	 reveal	 a	 close	 parallelism	 not	 only	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 structural	characteristic	of	horizontal	givenness:	Since	 “[t]he	objective	 intention	directed	 toward	the	 imagined	 object	 has	 its	 filling	 in	 the	 experienced	 phantasms,	 just	 as	 the	 objective	intention	 in	 perception	 has	 its	 filling	 in	 sensations”	 (Husserl	 2005,	 93;	 translation	modified),	 the	 parallelism	 between	 perception	 and	 imagination	 involves	 the	 crucial	concept	of	fulfillment	too.		There	are,	as	we	have	seen,	important	essential	features	that	are	common	to	perception	and	imagination.	But,	of	course,	there	are	crucial	differences	as	well.	The	most	obvious	concerns	 the	 fact	 that,	unlike	 imagination,	perception	 is	an	“originally	presentive	mode	[of	consciousness]”	(Husserl	1982,	327).	What	this	means	can	again	be	illustrated	with	recourse	to	the	earlier	example:	If	I	perceive	my	bike	standing	in	my	office,	then	this	act	is	self-giving	with	regard	to	actual	things	(my	bike)	and	states	of	affairs	(that	my	bike	is	standing	in	my	office).	Thus,	it	is	not	only	the	case	that	the	perceptual	givenness	of	my	bike	intuitively	fulfills	the	thought	that	my	bike	is	in	my	office.	Even	more	importantly,	the	 perceptual	 act	 “gives	 its	 object	 itself	 in	 the	 flesh”	 (Husserl	 2001c,	 140)	 and	 thus	exhibits	 a	 particular	 quality	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 contemporary	 analytic	 literature	under	 labels	 such	 as	 “presentational	 feel”	 (Foster	 2000,	 112),	 “scene-immediacy”	(Sturgeon	2000,	24)	or	“presentational	phenomenology”	(Chudnoff	2013,	chapter	1.2).	On	a	phenomenological	view,	this	quality	is	a	main	reason	why	we	take	perceptual	acts	to	confer	 justification	on	empirical	beliefs.	 I	 see	my	bike	 leaning	against	 the	bookshelf	and	it	instantly	seems	to	me	that	what	I	see	is	a	truthmaker	for	the	proposition	“My	bike	is	in	the	office”.	The	fact	that	the	visual	experience	of	my	bike	instantiates	the	quality	of	having	a	“presentational	feel”	explains	why	this	is	so.		But	now	compare	this	with	the	case	of	imagination:	If	I	imagine	my	bike	standing	in	the	office,	 then	 this,	 as	 I	 have	 pointed	 out,	 also	 counts	 as	 a	 case	 of	 fulfillment:	What	was	empty	 before	 is	 now	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 quasi-sensory	 experience	 of	 my	 imagined	 bike.	However,	clearly,	 the	quasi-experience	of	an	imagined	bike	 is	no	 justifier	 for	the	belief	that	my	bike	is	in	my	office.	Phenomenologically	construed,	this	is	because	imaginative	
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quasi-experiences	do	not	instantiate	the	property	of	having	a	“presentational	feel”	with	respect	to	actual	things	and	states	of	affairs.	While	“[p]erception	makes	a	present	reality	appear	to	us	as	present	and	as	a	reality	[…],	[imagination],	on	the	other	hand,	lacks	the	consciousness	of	reality	in	relation	to	what	is	[imagined]”	(Husserl	2005,	4).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	imagination	does	not	count	as	a	direct	source	of	justification	of	empirical	beliefs.		Perception	is	an	act	that	gives	its	object	as	actual.	An	act	of	imagination	gives	its	object	as	non-actual.	This,	in	a	nutshell,	is	the	reason	why	the	imagination	does	not	count	as	a	direct	 source	 of	 empirical	 justification.	 But	 there	 is	 a	 second,	 even	more	 fundamental	difference	that	concerns	the	conditions	under	which	anticipations	and	expectations6	are	frustrated	 in	 each	 respective	 realm.	 Here	 is	 an	 example	 that	 illustrates	 the	 point:	Suppose	 that	 I	 perceive	 the	 greyish	 blue	 of	 my	 bike’s	 facing	 side.	 And	 suppose	furthermore	 that	 –	 for	 whatever	 reasons	 –	 the	 horizon	 in	 which	 this	 perception	 is	embedded	comes	with	 the	anticipation	 that	my	bike’s	backside	 is	 coated	 in	pure	gold.	What	will	happen?	Since	a	bike	that	is	both	mine	and	ridiculously	expensive	isn’t	part	of	the	 inventory	 of	 the	 actual	 world,	 this	 anticipation	 will	 be	 frustrated	 by	 further	perceptual	 experiences.	 And,	 obviously,	 there	 is	 nothing	 I	 can	 do	 about	 this:	 By	 and	large,	our	perceptual	experiences	are	not	under	our	voluntary	control;	their	occurrence	as	well	as	their	content	is	systematically	fixed	by	our	external	environment.			But	things	are	entirely	different	in	the	imagination.	Suppose	that	I	imagine	my	bike.	And	suppose	 furthermore	 that	 the	horizon	 in	which	my	 imagined	bike	 is	given	comes	with	the	anticipation	that	its	backside	is	coated	in	pure	gold.	Obviously,	nothing	prevents	me	from	 imagining	 my	 bike	 in	 a	 way	 so	 that	 the	 anticipation	 of	 a	 gold-coated	 backside	would	be	 intuitively	 fulfilled.	Generally	 speaking,	we	know	 that	we	 can	do	 all	 sorts	 of	crazy	things	in	the	sphere	of	imagination:	I	could	imagine	my	bike	as	almost	transparent	or	tall	like	a	mountain.	I	could	imagine	that	it	is	accelerated	to	90%	of	the	speed	of	light.	Or	I	could	imagine	that	my	bike	transmutes	into	a	honeybee	and	flies	away.	It	is	in	my	freedom	 to	 project	 these	 and	 indefinitely	 many	 other	 scenarios	 with	 the	 help	 of	 my	imaginative	capacities.	Hence,	while	the	persistency	of	anticipations	and	expectations	is	strictly	regulated	by	the	external	world	in	the	perceptual	sphere,	the	imagination	seems	to	be	distinguished	by	“its	optional	character	 [and]	 therefore,	speaking	 ideally,	 [by]	 its	unconditioned	 arbitrariness”	 (Husserl	 2005,	 642).	 “[I]t	 remains”,	 as	 Husserl	 puts	 it	elsewhere,	 “within	 the	province	of	our	 freedom	 to	allow	 the	 indeterminateness	of	 […]	horizons	to	be	quasi-fulfilled	in	an	arbitrary	way	by	imagining.”	(Husserl	1973,	171)		Given	 this	 rough-and-ready	 comparison,	 one	 could	 come	 to	 the	 following	 conclusion:	Imagination	is	like	perception	in	many	ways.	But	beneath	the	surface	of	similarities,	two	crucial	 differences	 remain:	 First,	 perception	 gives	 its	 objects	 as	 actual.	 The	 objects	 of	imagination,	on	the	other	hand,	exhibit	the	“characteristic	of	inactuality”	(Husserl	2005,	320).	 Secondly,	 perceptual	 anticipations	 and	 expectations	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 external	
																																																								6	A	 word	 on	 terminology:	 Anticipations	 are	 non-independent	 parts	 of	 perceptual	 experiences.	 If,	 for	instance,	 I	enter	 the	kitchen	and	 flip	 the	 light	switch,	 the	experience	of	 the	 flipping	of	 the	switch	comes	with	the	tacit	anticipation	that	the	light	will	go	on.	This	anticipation	is	neither	an	act	in	its	own	right	nor	is	it	 consciously	experienced	 in	 the	normal	course	of	events.	However,	anticipations	can	become	the	basis	for	separate	acts	of	expectation.	 If,	 for	 instance,	 I	have	 just	repaired	the	 light	switch	and	check	 it	 for	the	very	first	time,	the	flipping	of	the	switch	may	come	with	the	expectation	that	the	light	will	go	on.	In	this	case,	the	expectation	is	an	act	in	its	own	right	and	has	the	status	of	an	explicit	prognosis	of	future	events.	
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world.	 Imaginative	 anticipations	 and	 expectations,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 seem	 to	 be	essentially	unrestricted.			If	 we	 take	 this	 result	 as	 conclusive,	 then	 this	 also	 has	 serious	 consequences	 for	 the	phenomenological	 understanding	 of	 TEs.	 In	 particular,	 the	 paradox	 of	 TEs	 seems	 to	return	within	the	 framework	of	phenomenology	 in	 its	original	 force:	Scientific	TEs	are	supposed	 to	 justify	 beliefs	 about	 the	 empirical	 world.	 But	 since	 TEs	 rely	 on	 our	imaginative	 capacities,	 and	 since	 the	 imagination	 is	 no	 direct	 source	 of	 empirical	justification,	we	are	 in	need	of	a	plausible	story	about	how	TEs	could	possibly	achieve	this	aim.	But	whatever	story	we	tell,	we	will	have	to	confront	the	following	worry:	The	principal	 reason	 for	regarding	physical	experiments	as	epistemically	significant	 is	 that	our	expectations	towards	them	can	be	and	quite	regularly	are	frustrated	by	perceptual	experiences	whose	 occurrence	 and	 content	 is	 not	 controlled	 by	 us.	 To	 put	 it	 bluntly:	When	we	perform	physical	experiments,	reality	sometimes	“kicks	back”	at	us.	And	if	 it	does,	 we	 learn	 something	 utterly	 important,	 namely	 that	 the	 world	 is	 different	 from	what	 we	 had	 expected.	 But	 what	 could	 possibly	 “kick	 back”	 at	 us	 in	 TEs?	 Since	 TEs	exploit	 our	 imaginative	 capacities,	 and	 since,	 apparently,	 these	 capacities	 are	characterized	by	the	unconditional	freedom	to	imagine	whatever	we	like,	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	and	frustration	in	TEs	appear	to	be	completely	under	our	control.	If	that	is	the	 case,	 however,	 then	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 see	 how	 TEs	 could	 possibly	 qualify	 as	 a	 serious	method	 of	 knowledge	 acquisition.	 Viewed	 in	 this	 light,	 TEs	 are	 similar	 to	 children’s	games.	Of	course,	they	are	fun	to	play.	But	since	their	rules	can	change	erratically	at	any	time	during	the	process,	they	are	also	somehow	pointless	from	an	adult’s	perspective.		
4. Three	Types	of	Constraints	
	Here	is	the	upshot	of	the	previous	section:	In	order	to	solve	the	paradox	of	TEs,	we	need	to	tell	a	story	about	why	the	imagination	can	be	regarded	as	a	source	of	stable	evidence.	But	 there	 is	 an	 obstacle	 to	 any	 such	 story:	One	 of	 the	 principal	 reasons	 for	 regarding	perception	as	 epistemically	valuable	 is	 that	what	 is	perceived	 is	not	 entirely	up	 to	us.	The	 occurrence	 as	well	 as	 the	 content	 of	 our	 perceptual	 experiences	 is	 systematically	fixed	by	our	external	surroundings.	Imaginings,	on	the	other	hand,	seem	to	lack	external	constraints:	 Apparently,	we	 are	 free	 to	 imagine	whatever	we	 like,	whenever	we	 like.7	Hence,	 the	 conditions	 of	 fulfillment	 and	 frustration	 appear	 to	 be	 entirely	 under	 our	control	 in	 the	 sphere	of	 the	 imagination.	But	 if	 this	 is	 true,	 then	 it	 is	 unclear	how	 the	imagination	could	possibly	generate	stable	evidence.		On	the	basis	of	what	has	just	been	said,	a	skeptical	attitude	towards	the	epistemic	value	of	imagination	(and,	consequently,	of	TEs)	is	fuelled	by	the	view	of	imagination	as	being	essentially	unrestricted.	But	 is	this	view	correct?	In	what	 follows	I	will	 try	to	convince	you	that	it	isn’t.	My	aim	in	this	section	is	to	go	through	a	couple	of	examples	in	order	to	make	 clear	 that,	 how	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 course	 as	 well	 as	 the	 content	 of	 our	imaginings	are	subject	to	three	different	types	of	external	constraints.	Getting	clear	on																																																									7	Sartre	seems	to	 follow	this	 line	of	reasoning	when	he	comes	to	 the	conclusion	“that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	find	in	the	[mental]	image	anything	more	than	what	one	puts	into	it;	in	other	words,	the	[mental]	image	teaches	 nothing”	 (Sartre	 2004,	 103).	 But	 similar	 views	 can	 also	 be	 found	 outside	 of	 phenomenology:	Consider,	for	instance,	Ludwig	Wittgenstein’s	remark	that	“[i]t	is	just	because	imaging	is	subject	to	the	will	that	it	does	not	instruct	us	about	the	external	world”	(Wittgenstein	1980,	§80).	Or	take	Alan	White’s	more	recent	assessment	that	“one	can’t	be	surprised	by	the	features	of	what	one	imagines,	since	one	put	them	there”	(White	1990,	92).	
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the	 nature	 of	 these	 types	 will	 finally	 bring	 us	 closer	 to	 a	 phenomenological	understanding	of	how	knowledge	is	generated	through	TEs.		Suppose,	that	I	ask	you	to	imagine	Bart	Simpson	writing	“I	will	not	use	abbrev.”	on	Mrs.	Krabappel’s	 blackboard.	 If	 you	 do	 so,	 then	 the	 object	 of	 your	 attention	 is	 a	 yellow	cartoon	 character	 that	 is	 scribbling	 on	 a	 blackboard.	 Yet,	 co-given	 with	 this	 initial	experience	 is	 the	 anticipation	 of	 further	 features	 of	 the	 imagined	 scenario:	 Although	these	 features	 aren’t	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 attention	 right	 from	 the	 start,	 you	 automatically	anticipate	further	aspects	such	as	the	spikiness	of	Bart’s	hair,	the	purple	wall	behind	the	blackboard,	Bart’s	depraved	behaviour	or	his	red	pants.	But	wait!	While	the	sequence	of	imaginings	evolves	 in	more	and	more	detail,	you	suddenly	realize	 that	something	 isn’t	right.	Even	though	you	can’t	quite	figure	out	what	it	 is,	the	whole	scenario	doesn’t	feel	like	it	should.	It	is	only	through	careful	reflection	that	you	finally	notice	what	bothered	you:	Bart’s	pants	are	blue,	not	red!		What	 happened	 in	 the	 situation	 just	 described?	 To	 begin	 with,	 by	 following	 my	instruction	to	imagine	Bart	Simpson,	you	immersed	yourself	in	the	quasi-world	of	“The	Simpsons”	 and	 thus	 accepted	 certain	 limitations	 to	 your	 imagining.	The	 concept	 “Bart	Simpson”	contains	what	has	become	known	to	you	and	your	epistemic	community	about	the	kind	of	object	in	question.	Hence,	by	applying	the	concept	“Bart	Simpson”	in	order	to	determine	 what	 you	 were	 about	 to	 imagine,	 you	 activated	 certain	 parts	 of	 your	background	knowledge	that,	in	turn,	motivated	a	horizon	through	which	further	quasi-experiences	were	anticipated.	It	is	of	course	true	that	the	imagination,	unlike	perception,	gives	 you	 the	 freedom	 to	 produce	 quasi-experiences	 that	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 what	 is	contained	 in	 the	 initial	 concept:	You	could	either	consciously	decide	 to	 imagine	quasi-experiences	that	are	not	compatible	with	the	concept	“Bart	Simpson”.	Or	you	could	just	inadvertently	 fail	 to	stay	within	the	boundaries	of	what	the	concept	prescribes.	But,	 in	any	 case,	 if	 you	 imagine	 a	white	 cartoon	 character	 that	 has	 a	 yellow	bill	 and	wears	 a	sailor	 shirt	with	a	 red	bow	 tie,	 then	you	obviously	 failed	 to	 immerse	yourself	 into	 the	quasi-world	of	“The	Simpsons”.		There	are	further	lessons	to	draw	from	this	example:	First,	 it	underscores	the	fact	that	normally,	when	we	 employ	our	 imaginative	 capacities,	we	 are	not	 imagining	 series	 of	disconnected	 figments.	 Rather,	 most	 imaginative	 processes	 consist	 of	 sequences	 of	related	imaginings	that,	in	their	temporal	succession,	form	a	coherent	whole.	And,	given	the	example	above,	it	is	easy	to	see	where	the	coherence	is	coming	from:	it	is	ensured	by	the	background	knowledge	that	enters	the	imagination	through	the	concepts	with	which	we	 determine	what	we	 intend	 to	 imagine	 and	 from	which	 our	 imaginative	 processes	take	 their	 basic	 direction.	 This	 is	 not	 only	 true	 when	 we	 are	 asked	 to	 imagine	 Bart	Simpson.	It	is	also	true	when	we	are	using	our	imaginative	capacities	to	decide	whether	the	sofa	at	Ikea	will	fit	through	the	hallway	at	home.	In	both	of	these	cases,	the	concepts	through	which	we	determine	what	we	intend	to	imagine	refer	to	chunks	of	background	knowledge	that,	in	turn,	put	constraints	on	how	our	imagining	can	evolve.	To	be	sure,	we	could	 always	 break	 the	 coherence	 by	 imagining	 quasi-experiences	 that	 stand	 in	 no	relation	 to	 what	 has	 been	 imagined	 before.	 But,	 given	 our	 practical	 ends	 at	 Ikea,	imagining	 a	 sofa	 that	 suddenly	 transforms	 into	 a	 swarm	 of	 butterflies	 just	 isn’t	 the	rational	thing	to	do.		What	 the	 example	 of	 Bart	 Simpson	 also	 shows	 is	 that,	 secondly,	 frustration	 is	 by	 no	means	impossible	in	the	sphere	of	the	imagination.	Other	than	in	the	perceptual	realm,	
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however,	anticipations	and	expectations	are	not	frustrated	by	quasi-experiences	alone.	Imaginative	 anticipations	 are	 frustrated	 by	 way	 of	 a	 comparison	 between	 quasi-experiences	 and	 the	 background	 knowledge	 that	 enters	 the	 imagination	 through	 the	concepts	with	which	we	 determine	 the	 course	 of	 our	 imagining.	 This	 is	 exactly	 what	happened	 in	 the	 example	 above:	 Initially,	 the	 content	 as	 well	 as	 the	 course	 of	 our	imaginative	 endeavours	 were	 determined	 by	 the	 concept	 “Bart	 Simpson”.	 And	 it	 was	through	 reflection	 on	 the	 background	 knowledge	 to	 which	 the	 concept	 refers	 that	certain	quasi-experiences	could	be	singled	out	as	being	at	odds	with	what	the	concept	prescribes.	Hence,	 there	turns	out	to	be	a	close	relationship	between	the	conditions	of	frustration	on	the	one	hand	and	the	concepts	that	determine	the	course	of	our	imagining	on	 the	other.	Given	 this	relationship,	we	can	 formulate	an	 important	conclusion:	 If	we	want	to	learn	about	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	and	frustration	in	a	given	imaginative	process,	 we	 have	 to	 look	 closely	 at	 the	 concepts	 through	 which	 the	 horizontal	anticipations	are	determined.8		What	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 do	 so	 far	 in	 this	 section	 is	 take	 some	 first	 steps	 towards	undermining	the	view	according	to	which	the	imagination	is	epistemically	inept	due	to	the	lack	of	external	constraints	to	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	and	frustration.	Following	my	 analysis,	 the	 imagination	 indeed	 gives	 us	 the	 freedom	 to	 produce	 random	 quasi-experiences	that	aren’t	related	to	earlier	imaginings.	However,	it	is	also	possible	to	use	our	imaginative	capacities	differently:	We	can	choose	to	immerse	ourselves	in	a	quasi-world	 by	 staying	 within	 the	 boundaries	 that	 are	 prescribed	 by	 the	 concepts	 through	which	we	determine	what	we	actually	wish	to	imagine.	And	if	we	do	so,	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	 and	 frustration	 are	 externally	 fixed;	 they	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 background	knowledge	 that	 enters	 the	 imagination	 through	 the	 concepts	 that	 give	 our	 imaginings	their	basic	direction.		Assume	for	the	moment	that	the	foregoing	analysis	is	correct.	Even	if	it	is,	however,	one	could	still	wonder	whether	it	really	captures	what	is	truly	characteristic	of	scientific	TEs.	One	 could	 argue	 as	 follows:	 It	 may	 be	 true	 that	 the	 conditions	 of	 fulfillment	 and	frustration	 are	 relatively	 well	 defined	 as	 long	 as	 we	 use	 the	 imagination	 in	 a	 fairly	conservative	fashion	by	sticking	to	concepts	such	as	“Bart	Simpson”	or	“bike”.	Concepts	like	 these	 prescribe	 clear	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 because	 they	 refer	 to	 rather	uncontroversial	 chunks	 of	 empirical	 background	 knowledge	 that	 have	 been	 acquired	through	 common	 experiential	 sources.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 “Bart	 Simpson”,	 for	 instance,	we	know	what	to	 imagine	because	we	have	spent	many	hours	watching	the	respective	TV	show.	But	 isn’t	 it	 characteristic	of	TEs	 to	employ	our	 imaginative	capacities	 in	a	much	more	exceptional	manner?	Of	 course,	 at	 first	glance,	 scientific	TEs	also	 seem	to	utilize	fairly	 conventional	 concepts	 such	 as	 “bucket”,	 “car”,	 “train”,	 “cat”	 or	 “tower”.	 But	 the	point	 of	most	 scientific	TEs	 is	 to	 imagine	 these	objects	under	 conditions	 to	which	 the	more	 common	 parts	 of	 our	 background	 knowledge	 do	 not	 apply.	 Our	 common	background	 knowledge	 may	 prescribe	 clear	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 if,	 for	 instance,	 we	imagine	a	car	that	is	rushing	towards	a	garage	with	100	km/h.	But	what	determines	the																																																									8	This,	of	course,	is	not	only	true	of	the	imagination.	Suppose	that	you	see	an	object	that	looks	like	a	barn.	If	you	apply	the	concept	“barn”	to	the	seen	object,	then	you	will	anticipate	the	object	to	have	a	backside	that	resembles	its	facing	side.	Accordingly,	the	experience	of	a	backside	that	doesn’t	resemble	the	facing	side	(for	instance,	a	backside	that	is	characteristic	of	fake	barns)	will	frustrate	your	initial	intention.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	you	apply	the	concept	“fake	barn”	to	the	seen	object,	a	backside	that	doesn’t	resemble	the	facing	side	is	exactly	what	you	anticipate.	Hence,	a	close	relation	between	concepts	and	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	 and	 frustration	 is	 not	 only	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 imagination,	 but	 also	 in	 the	perceptual	realm	(cf.	also	Hopp	2011,	chapter	2.1).	
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conditions	 of	 fulfillment	 and	 frustration	 if	 we	 are	 imagining	 a	 car	 rushing	 toward	 a	garage	with	90%	of	the	speed	of	light?		Even	a	cursory	 look	at	 the	practice	of	TE-reasoning	 in	science	reveals	 that	TEs	 indeed	employ	our	imaginative	capacities	in	a	quite	exceptional	way.	In	order	for	most	scientific	TEs	to	be	performed,	we	have	to	immerse	ourselves	in	quasi-worlds	that	differ	from	our	actual	world	in	more	or	less	drastic	ways.	As	the	following	examples	show,	“immersion”	consists	in	the	active	bracketing	and/or	modification	of	certain	parts	of	our	background	knowledge:	Immersion	into	the	quasi-world	of	Galileo’s	ship	consists	 in	bracketing	the	background	knowledge	according	to	which	ships	at	sea	are	always	subjected	to	rocking	motions.	 Immersion	 into	 the	 quasi-world	 of	 Stevin’s	 chain	 consists	 in	 bracketing	 the	background	 knowledge	 according	 to	 which	 objects	 moving	 down	 inclined	 planes	 are	always	 subjected	 to	 kinetic	 friction	 and	 air	 drag.	 Immersion	 into	 the	 quasi-world	 of	Newton’s	bucket	consists	 in	bracketing	the	background	knowledge	according	to	which	the	material	universe	consists	of	more	objects	than	just	a	water	bucket	and	a	rope.		As	 we	 shall	 see	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 selective	 with	 regard	 to	 the	background	 knowledge	 that	 determines	 the	 content	 as	 well	 as	 the	 course	 of	 our	imaginings	 is	 indeed	 crucial	 for	 TEs	 in	 science.	 In	 the	 present	 context,	 however,	 this	ability	 is	 still	 a	 reason	 for	 concern.	 Our	 problem	 was	 this:	 In	 standard	 cases	 of	imaginative	activity,	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	and	frustration	are	determined	by	the	relevant	parts	of	our	background	knowledge	 that	have	been	acquired	 in	 the	 course	of	previous	encounters	with	the	world.	But	what	determines	the	conditions	of	 fulfillment	and	 frustration	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 imagination	 takes	 us	 well	 beyond	 our	 ordinary	experiential	grasp?			The	obvious	answer	 is	 that	much	of	what	we	anticipate	and	expect	 in	scientific	TEs	 is	determined	 by	 the	 theories	 that	 work	 in	 the	 background	 of	 these	 TEs.	 The	aforementioned	car/garage-TE	from	Special	Relativity	is	a	case	in	point:	If	we	are	asked	to	imagine	a	car	that	 is	rushing	towards	a	garage	with	90%	of	the	speed	of	 light,	 then,	obviously,	 our	 anticipations	 and	 expectations	 aren’t	 guided	 by	 previous	 perceptual	encounters	with	this	kind	of	scenario.	What	determines	the	course	of	our	imaginings	is	rather	 a	 theory	 according	 to	 which	 the	 measured	 length	 of	 an	 object	 decreases	noticeably	at	velocities	close	to	c.9	The	point	is	even	more	obvious	considering	examples	such	 as	Heisenberg’s	 gamma-ray	microscope	 or	 EPR:	 In	 cases	 like	 these,	 not	 only	 the	course,	 but	 even	 the	 content	 of	 our	 imaginings	 is	 almost	 entirely	 determined	 by	theoretical	 components	 of	 our	 background	 knowledge.	 To	 put	 it	 bluntly:	 We	 just	wouldn’t	know	what	to	imagine	if	we	didn’t	know	a	thing	about	quantum	mechanics.		Many	 constraints	 that	 impinge	 on	 our	 imaginative	 activities	 are	 due	 to	 empirical	components	 of	 our	 background	 knowledge.	Others	 are	 due	 to	 theoretical	 parts	 of	 our	background	 knowledge.	 This,	 in	 a	 nutshell,	 is	 the	 upshot	 of	 this	 section.	 However,	phenomenologically	construed,	 there	 is	yet	a	 third	 type	of	constraints	 that	are	neither	empirical	 nor	 theoretical	 in	 nature.	 Here	 is	 an	 example	 that	 might	 help	 to	 make	 my																																																									9	On	closer	inspection,	the	car/garage-TE	is	particularly	interesting	because	it	is	not	at	all	clear	which	part	of	Special	Relativity	should	actually	determine	what	we	are	supposed	 to	 imagine	 in	 this	TE:	On	 the	one	hand,	Special	Relativity	tells	us	that	objects	moving	with	velocities	close	to	c	are	Lorentz-contracted.	On	the	other	hand,	we	know	since	the	1930ies	that	Lorentz-contracted	objects	would	not	appear	contracted,	but	 rotated	 (Lampa	 1924;	 Terrell	 1959;	 Penrose	 1959).	 This	 raises	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 it	 is	relevant	for	the	success	of	TEs	to	imagine	objects	realistically	(cf.	Brown	2013).		
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point:	Suppose	that	I	ask	you	to	 imagine	a	brick	that	 is	thrown	against	a	windowpane.	And	 suppose	 furthermore	 that	 I	 ask	 you	 to	 bracket	 everything	 you	 know	 about	 the	behaviour	of	bricks	and	windowpanes.	Hence,	what	I	ask	you	to	imagine	is	a	quasi-world	in	 which	 bricks	 and	 windowpanes	 look	 like	 actual	 bricks	 and	 windowpanes,	 but	 in	which	 their	 behaviour	 is	 absolutely	 unpredictable.	Now	 the	 question	 is	 this:	 Are	 your	anticipations	 and	 expectations	 concerning	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	 brick	 and	 the	windowpane	indeterminate?	Are	the	conditions	of	fulfillment	and	frustration	entirely	up	to	you?		At	 first	 sight,	 this	 question	might	 seem	 odd.	 If	 you	 are	 serious	 about	 bracketing	 your	background	 knowledge	 about	 bricks	 and	 windowpanes,	 then,	 apparently,	 there	 is	nothing	 left	 that	 could	 possibly	 determine	 your	 anticipations	 and	 expectations	 in	 the	scenario	described	above.	You	could	imagine	a	quasi-world	in	which	windowpanes	are	shattered	upon	impact.	But	you	could	also	imagine	a	quasi-world	in	which	it	is	the	bricks	that	 crumble	 to	dust	whenever	 they	hit	a	windowpane.	Or	you	could	 imagine	a	quasi-world	in	which	windowpanes	transmute	into	sprays	of	flowers	whenever	they	are	hit	by	bricks.	 In	 short:	 After	 bracketing	 your	 background	 knowledge,	 no	 anticipation	 is	 too	outlandish	to	be	in	principle	unfulfillable	by	matching	quasi-experiences.	Or	so,	at	least,	it	seems.		In	fact	I	think	this	view	is	descriptively	wrong.	There	are	restrictions	to	what	we	can	or	cannot	imagine,	even	after	we	have	bracketed	our	entire	background	knowledge	about	the	objects	in	question.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	anticipation	of	a	windowpane	that	is	completely	 shattered	 and	 completely	 unshattered,	 both	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 As	 you	 can	easily	 verify	 by	 trying	 to	 actually	 imagine	 this	 scenario,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 intuitively	fulfill	 this	 anticipation.	 Or	 consider	 the	 anticipation	 of	 a	 brick	 that	 is	 red	 and	 blue	 all	over.	 Here	 too,	 we	 fail	 to	 imagine	 a	 fulfilling	 quasi-experience.	 Or	 consider	 the	anticipation	 of	 a	 brick	 that	 is	 seen	 from	 all	 sides	 at	 once	 or	 whose	 redness	 can	 be	smelled.	 Again,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 imagine	 a	 quasi-world	 in	which	 these	 anticipations	would	be	fulfilled	by	matching	quasi-experiences.	In	all	of	these	cases	the	problem	is	not	that	a	particular	quasi-experience	contradicts	a	rule	of	anticipation	that	suggests	itself	in	the	light	of	previous	encounters	with	the	actual	world	or	in	the	light	of	a	theory.	Rather,	the	problem	is	that	certain	quasi-experiences	are	impossible	to	imagine,	no	matter	how	hard	we	try.	In	all	of	the	aforementioned	cases	we	have	to	realize	that	the	“freedom	[of	voluntarily	producing	quasi-experiences]	is	limited	insofar	as	essential	laws	of	possible	
quasi-fulfillment	 are	 inherent	 here	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 an	 identical	possible	 objectivity	 understood	 as	 intentional	 and	 still	 indeterminate”	 (Husserl	 2005,	671).	 Hence,	 the	 content	 and	 course	 of	 our	 imaginings	 is	 not	 only	 determined	 by	empirical	 and	 theoretical	 components	 of	 our	 background	 knowledge.	Phenomenologically	construed,	our	 imaginings	are	also	constrained	by	“necessary	laws	which	determine	what	must	necessarily	belong	 to	an	object	 in	order	 that	 it	 can	be	an	object	of	this	kind”	(Husserl	1973,	352).			In	a	 recent	paper,	Walter	Hopp	has	drawn	particular	attention	 to	 the	 role	 this	kind	of	essential	knowledge	plays	 in	TE-reasoning.	One	of	Hopp’s	main	theses	is	“that	thought	experiments,	at	 their	best,	are	 in	 fact	 founded	on	acts	of	 fulfillment	 in	which	we	 intuit	universals	 and	 the	 relations	 among	 them,	 and	 that	 the	 actual	 instantiation	 of	 those	universals	and	relations	is	immaterial”	(Hopp	2014,	81).	In	advancing	this	claim,	Hopp	emphasizes	the	similarities	between	Brown’s	Platonism	and	a	phenomenological	theory	of	TEs.	According	to	Hopp’s	analysis,	both	accounts	agree	in	their	acknowledgment	of	a	
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knowledge-yielding	faculty	that	is	independent	of	the	five	senses	and	that	is	operative	in	at	least	some	TEs.10		What	 I	have	 tried	 to	do	 in	 this	 section	 is	 to	undermine	 the	view	of	 the	 imagination	as	essentially	 unrestricted.	 If	 my	 analysis	 is	 correct,	 then	 our	 imaginative	 capacities	 are	subject	 to	 three	 types	 of	 constraints:	 First,	 there	 are	 constraints	 that	 are	 due	 to	 the	empirical	parts	of	our	background	knowledge.	Secondly,	there	are	constraints	that	result	from	 the	 theories	 that	we	have	 incorporated	 into	our	background	knowledge.	Thirdly	and	 finally,	 there	 are	 constraints	 that	 are	due	 to	 “essential	 laws	which	 govern	 acts	 as	
intentional	 experiences,	 in	 all	 their	 modes	 of	 sense-giving	 objectivation,	 and	 their	fulfilling	constitution	of	‘true	being’”	(Husserl	2001b,	319).		
5. Putting	the	Pieces	Together		With	the	above	findings	in	place,	we	can	finally	turn	to	the	heart	of	this	paper.	Drawing	on	 the	 results	 from	 the	 previous	 sections,	 I	 will	 now	 take	 a	 first	 stab	 at	 a	phenomenological	description	of	TE-reasoning	in	science.	On	my	view,	TE-reasoning	is	a	process	 that	occurs	 in	 three	stages:	 the	preparatory	stage,	 the	performance	stage,	and	the	conclusion	stage.	I	will	comment	on	each	of	these	stages	in	turn.		
5.1	The	Preparatory	Stage		Before	we	can	even	begin	to	perform	a	TE,	we	need	to	know	a	couple	of	things.	First	of	all,	and	most	obviously,	we	must	know	to	what	end	the	TE	is	performed.	This	is	to	say	that	we	need	a	sufficiently	clear	grasp	of	the	target	thesis	that	the	TE	is	meant	to	refute,	to	 corroborate	 or	 to	 clarify.	 Secondly,	 and	 no	 less	 importantly,	 we	 need	 information	about	the	kind	of	scenario	we	are	supposed	to	imagine.	This	information	is	encapsulated	in	 the	 TE-narrative	 in	 which	 the	 details	 of	 the	 TE-setup	 is	 specified.	 Of	 course,	 TE-narratives	differ	significantly	with	respect	to	detail,	complexity	and	style.	Some	of	them	are	 text-only.	 Others	 also	make	 use	 of	 visualizations.	 Some	 of	 them	 are	 colourful	 and	filigreed.	 Others	 are	 strictly	 technical	 and	 reduced	 to	 the	 bare	 essentials.	 In	 any	 case,	however,	 TE-narratives	 pursue	 a	 twofold	 task:	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 TE-narratives	 tell	 us	something	about	the	objects	of	which	the	TE-scenario	is	composed.	On	the	other	hand,	TE-narratives	specify	the	characteristics	of	the	quasi-worlds	in	which	TE-scenario	is	to	be	 imagined.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 following	 excerpt	 from	 a	TE-narrative	 from	 a	standard	physics	textbook:			 “A	man	has	an	l	=	5	m	long	garage	and	buys	and	l0	=	7	m	long	car	(proper	length	of	 the	 car).	 He	 reasons	 that,	 if	 he	 drives	 sufficiently	 fast,	 the	 car	will	 fit	 in	 the	garage	due	to	length	contraction	(ignore	the	fact	that	he	is	going	to	ruin	his	new	car	by	smashing	it	against	the	garage	wall).”	(Faraoni	2013,	25)																																																										10	It	 must	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 Hopp	 is	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 a	 phenomenological	theory	of	TEs	and	Brown’s	(cf.	Hopp	2014,	89-90).	While	phenomenologists	will	typically	not	be	at	odds	with	the	rationalist	part	of	Brown’s	story	–	particularly	with	his	claim	that	sense	experience	is	not	the	sole	source	of	knowledge	about	the	world	–,	they	will	most	certainly	take	issue	with	his	construal	of	the	laws	of	nature	and	with	his	Platonist	two-world	ontology.	Hence,	building	on	Davies’	useful	distinction	between	extreme	 and	 moderate	 deflationism	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 (two	 kinds	 of)	 moderate	 and	 extreme	inflationism	on	the	other	(Davies	2007,	37-42),	phenomenology	positions	itself	somewhere	between	(the	second	kind	of)	moderate	and	extreme	inflationism.	
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In	order	 to	understand	 this	TE-narrative,	we	must	have	different	 types	of	background	knowledge	 at	 our	 disposal:	 While	 concepts	 such	 as	 “car”	 or	 “garage”	 refer	 to	conventional	 chunks	 of	 empirical	 background	 knowledge,	 concepts	 such	 as	 “proper	length”	or	“length	contraction”	refer	to	information	about	the	kind	of	physics	that	forms	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	TE.	It	is	only	if	these	pieces	of	information	are	part	of	our	general	background	knowledge	that	we	are	able	to	set	up	the	TE	accordingly.	If,	for	instance,	knowledge	about	Lorentz	contraction	is	 lacking,	then	we	inevitably	fail	 to	set	up	the	TE	according	to	the	intentions	of	its	presenter.		But	TE-narratives	not	only	give	us	information	about	the	kinds	of	objects	and	processes	that	we	need	to	imagine	in	order	to	carry	out	the	experiment.	TE-narratives	also	contain	information	about	 the	quasi-world	 in	which	 the	TE	ought	 to	be	performed.	While	 this	information	 is	only	 implicit	 in	many	cases,	 the	above-quoted	TE-narrative	hints	at	 the	specifics	 of	 the	 required	 quasi-world	 by	 remarking	 that	 no	 actual	 car	 would	 remain	intact	under	the	 imagined	conditions.	Of	course,	we	know	that	no	actual	brake	system	could	decelerate	the	car	from	velocities	close	to	c.	And	we	know	that	the	car	would	melt	in	less	than	a	blink	of	an	eye.	But	these	and	similar	other	components	of	our	background	knowledge	must	be	bracketed	if	we	want	to	immerse	ourselves	into	the	quasi-world	that	suits	the	TE	we	are	about	to	perform.	Like	many	other	TEs	in	physics,	the	car/garage-TE	just	wouldn’t	work	in	a	quasi-world	that	resembles	our	actual	world	too	closely.	The	TE	only	 works	 in	 an	 idealized	 quasi-world	 in	 which	 many	 factors	 that	 determine	 the	behaviour	of	the	actual	world	are	neglected.		
5.2	The	Performance	Stage		The	 purpose	 of	 a	 TE-narrative	 is	 to	 prime	 its	 audience	 for	 the	 performance	 of	 the	ensuing	 TE.	 The	 main	 tool	 for	 doing	 so	 is	 the	 concepts	 of	 which	 the	 narrative	 is	composed.	These	concepts	refer	to	the	kind	of	background	knowledge	that	is	necessary	in	order	for	the	TE	to	be	set	up.	It	 is	only	if	the	right	kind	of	background	knowledge	is	already	in	place	that	we	are	in	a	position	to	imagine	the	TE-setup	as	well	as	the	quasi-world	in	which	the	TE	ought	to	be	embedded.	Hence,	I	fully	agree	with	David	Gooding’s	observation	 that	 “[a]	 TE	 becomes	 possible	 [only]	 when	 a	 world	 is	 sufficiently	 well-represented	 that	 experimental	 procedures	 and	 their	 likely	 consequences	 can	 be	described	within	it”	(Gooding	1992,	281).	Whether	or	not	a	TE	manages	to	lead	us	to	its	desired	outcome	 largely	depends	on	our	 familiarity	with	 the	quasi-world	 in	which	 the	TE	ought	to	be	embedded	according	to	its	presenter.11																																																										11	This	point	also	has	implications	for	the	historiography	of	TEs.	As	historically	inclined	philosophers	such	as	James	McAllister	(1996)	or	Paolo	Palmieri	(2005)	have	emphasized,	it	is	common	in	the	philosophical	literature	 to	 make	 use	 of	 the	 history	 of	 TE-reasoning	 in	 a	 rather	 idiosyncratic,	 sometimes	 even	“cartoonish”	 (Palmieri	 2005,	 223)	 manner.	 Not	 only	 that	 case	 studies	 are	 presented	 without	 paying	sufficient	attention	 to	 their	context;	many	philosophers	also	approach	the	history	of	TE-reasoning	 in	an	overtly	“presentist”	or	“Whiggish”	way.	In	the	case	of	Galileo’s	famous	tower-TE,	for	instance,	it	has	been	objected	that	it	is	only	if	we	today	“look	at	this	thought	experiment	from	an	historically	distant	perspective	and	with	 the	 knowledge	 of	modern	 physics	 concerning	 falling	 bodies	 in	 a	 vacuum	 [that]	 the	 inference	from	the	contradiction	to	the	‘right’	conclusion	[…]	seems	to	be	immediate	and	untutored	by	any	empirical	or	logical	reasoning”	(Brendel	2004,	95;	cf.,	for	a	similar	complaint,	Norton	1996,	344-345).	What	seems	right	to	me	about	this	objection	is	the	almost	trivial	truth	that	we	cannot	presuppose	our	contemporary	background	 knowledge	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 determine	 the	 epistemic	 weight	 that	 a	 TE	 carried	 in	 its	 original	historical	 context.	 However,	 I	 also	 believe	 that	 the	 framework	 of	 phenomenology	 is	 particularly	 well-suited	to	draw	a	meaningful	distinction	between	the	epistemic	weight	a	TE	carries	for	us,	relative	to	our	modern	 background	 image	 of	 the	 world,	 and	 the	 epistemic	 weight	 a	 TE	 originally	 carried	 for	 a	 given	
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	Assume	 that	 we	 have	 successfully	 completed	 the	 preparatory	 stage	 in	 our	 current	example,	the	car/garage-TE.	This	is	to	say	that	we	have	a	sufficiently	clear	grasp	of	the	target	 thesis,	we	possess	 the	 right	kind	of	background	knowledge	 and	we	understand	the	specifics	of	the	quasi-world	in	which	the	TE-scenario	ought	to	be	imagined.	We	are	now	in	a	position	to	imagine	the	required	TE-setup.	If	we	do	so,	then	the	primary	object	of	 our	 intentional	 directedness	 is	 a	 scenario	 that	 consists	 of	 an	 imagined	 car	 that	 is	about	to	rush	towards	an	imagined	garage	at	a	speed	close	to	c.	However,	on	the	basis	of	our	 earlier	 reflections	 on	 the	 horizonal	 structure	 of	 intentionality,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	imagined	 car	 and	 the	 imagined	 garage	 is	 by	 no	 means	 all	 that	 is	 given	 to	 us	 in	 this	situation.	Co-given	with	the	quasi-experience	of	the	primary	object	is	an	array	of	empty	intentions	 that	 point	 towards	 possible	 future	 states	 of	 the	 imagined	 TE-scenario.	 In	imagining	the	TE-setup,	as	it	is	laid	out	in	the	TE-narrative,	we	automatically	co-intend	a	horizon	 that	 prescribes	 anticipatory	 rules	 concerning	 the	 course	 of	 further	 quasi-experiences.	 These	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 are	motivated	 by	 the	 background	 knowledge	that	 is	necessary	 for	 imagining	 the	TE-setup	 in	 the	 first	place.	And	 it	 is	 through	 these	anticipatory	rules	that	our	background	knowledge	restricts	how	the	imagined	scenario	could	evolve	if	the	corresponding	quasi-experiences	were	still	to	qualify	as	experiences	of	the	initial	scenario.			The	point	 I	 am	 trying	 to	make	 is	 this:	 If	we	 imagine	a	particular	TE-setup,	we	are	not	merely	imagining	a	particular	arrangement	of	imagined	objects	that	are	embedded	in	a	particular	quasi-world.	Since	the	objects	of	our	intentional	directedness	are	necessarily	given	in	horizons,	we	also	co-intend	rules	of	anticipation	that	restrict	how	the	TE-setup	could	evolve	if	the	ensuing	phases	were	still	to	qualify	as	phases	of	the	initial	setup.	This	way	 of	 putting	 things	 also	makes	 clear	 what	 it	 actually	 means	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 TE:	 To	perform	a	TE	is	to	immerse	oneself	into	a	particular	quasi-world,	to	imagine	a	TE-setup	within	this	quasi-world	and	then	to	let	the	TE-setup	evolve	according	to	the	anticipatory	rules	that	are	co-given	with	each	and	every	quasi-experience	of	the	unfolding	TE.	Or,	to	put	 it	 in	 slightly	different	 terms:	To	perform	a	TE	 is	 to	 “live	 through”	 the	anticipatory	horizons	against	the	background	of	which	fulfilled	intentions	towards	particular	phases	of	 the	 imaginative	 process	 always	 stand	 out.12	With	 each	 new	 phase	 a	 new	 horizon	comes	 to	 fruition,	 “a	 new	 system	 of	 determinable	 indeterminacy,	 a	 new	 system	 of	progressive	 tendencies	with	corresponding	possibilities	of	entering	 into	determinately	ordered	systems	of	possible	[quasi-]appearances,	of	possible	ways	that	the	aspects	can	run	 their	 course,	 together	 with	 horizons	 that	 are	 inseparably	 affiliated	 with	 these	aspects”	(Husserl	2001c,	43).	In	this	whole	process	of	“living	through”	the	anticipatory	horizons	 in	which	each	phase	of	 the	 imaginative	process	 is	given,	processes	of	explicit	inferential	reasoning	are	mostly	absent.	This	explains	one	of	the	most	intriguing	features	of	 scientific	 TEs,	 namely	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 they	 are	 performed	 and	 the	 apparent	effortlessness	with	which	we	reach	the	desired	outcome.		According	 to	 view	 developed	 so	 far,	 the	 way	 the	 initial	 TE-setup	 pans	 out	 is	predelineated	by	the	rules	of	anticipation	that	come	with	every	new	quasi-experience	of	the	 unfolding	 TE.	 This,	 however,	 raises	 an	 obvious	 question:	 At	 any	 point	 during	 the	performance	 of	 a	 TE,	 there	 are	 far	 more	 empty	 intuitions	 towards	 future	 quasi-																																																																																																																																																																													historical	community.	Cf.,	for	a	couple	of	first	steps	towards	employing	the	phenomenological	tool	of	the	“epoché”	in	dealing	with	science	history,	Arabatzis	(2012)	and	Palmieri	(this	volume).	12	This	echoes	Gooding’s	remark	that	“[t]o	explain	the	force	of	an	experiment	it	helps	to	understand	it	as	a	process	to	be	worked	through,	rather	than	as	a	logical	structure”	(Gooding	1992,	283).		
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experiences	 than	 are	 relevant	 for	 the	 actual	 outcome	 of	 the	 TE.	 If	 we	 imagine	 a	 car	rushing	 towards	 a	 garage,	 for	 instance,	 we	 implicitly	 anticipate	 the	 car	 to	 have	 a	backside.	 Or	 we	 anticipate	 the	 garage	 to	 have	 a	 specific	 color.	 But,	 obviously,	anticipations	such	as	these	are	entirely	irrelevant	for	what	the	TE	is	supposed	to	show.	Hence,	 the	 question	 arises	 as	 to	 how	 relevant	 anticipations	 are	 distinguished	 from	irrelevant	ones.		I	 opened	 this	 section	with	 the	 remark	 that	 the	 aim	 of	 TE-narratives	 is	 to	 prime	 their	audience	 for	 the	ensuing	TE.	 In	 the	 light	of	 the	question	that	has	 just	been	raised,	 this	remark	must	 be	 further	 clarified:	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 TE-narratives	 tell	 us	what	we	 are	supposed	 to	 imagine.	 They	 do	 so	 by	 employing	 particular	 concepts	 that	 activate	particular	 components	 of	 our	 background	 knowledge.	 Anticipatory	 rules	 that	 are	motivated	by	these	components	then	restrict	how	the	ensuing	TE	can	unfold.	But	on	the	other	hand,	 and	equally	 important,	TE-narratives	also	give	us	 information	about	what	we	are	not	supposed	to	 imagine	(cf.	Davies	2007,	35).	 In	part	 this	 is	done	through	the	target-thesis	 that	 automatically	 narrows	 our	 focus	 to	 certain	 aspects	 and	 leaves	 out	others.	But	it	is	also	done	through	the	determination	of	the	quasi-world	in	which	the	TE	must	be	embedded.	By	bracketing	certain	parts	of	our	background	knowledge	in	order	to	 immerse	 ourselves	 in	 a	 particular	 quasi-world,	 we	 prevent	 certain	 rules	 of	anticipation	from	even	becoming	operative.	Our	normal	anticipations	concerning	objects	sliding	down	inclined	planes,	for	instance,	are	determined	by	the	background	knowledge	according	 to	which	 such	 objects	 are	 always	 subjected	 to	 kinetic	 friction	 and	 air	 drag.	However,	 as	 reliable	 as	 this	 background	 knowledge	 may	 ever	 be	 under	 standard	circumstances,	 the	 resulting	 rules	 of	 anticipation	 are	 entirely	 impractical	 for	 the	performance	of	TEs	like	Stevin’s	chain.	Hence,	in	order	to	let	the	imagination	in	such	TEs	be	 guided	 by	 the	 right	 kinds	 of	 anticipatory	 rules,	 parts	 of	 our	 common	 background	knowledge	must	 be	 bracketed	 already	 at	 the	 outset.	 Thus	 construed,	 bracketing	 is	 an	essential	tool	for	channelling	our	anticipations	in	desired	ways.			The	 previous	 remarks	 on	 the	 role	 of	 bracketing	 also	 allow	me	 to	 finally	 explicate	my	thesis	 according	 to	 which	 TEs	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 anticipation	 pumps.13	On	 the	view	proposed	here,	TE-narratives	are	well	designed	if	they	accomplish	two	objectives:	First,	they	must	trigger	the	right	kind	of	background	knowledge	in	order	to	motivate	the	right	 kinds	 of	 anticipatory	 rules.	 And	 secondly,	 they	 must	 ensure	 that	 these	 rules	 of	anticipation	 aren’t	 interfered	 by	 anticipations	 that	 are	 inessential	 or	 even	 an	impediment	for	reaching	the	desired	outcome	of	the	imaginative	process.	Hence,	to	put	it	 in	a	 slogan:	A	TE	 is	well-designed	 if	 the	TE-narrative	 is	 successful	 in	 “pumping”	 the	right	rules	of	anticipations.	The	“right”	rules	are	those	that	 lead	us	from	the	initial	TE-setup	to	the	desired	end	point	with	a	minimum	of	unnecessary	distractions.		
5.3	The	Conclusion	Stage		To	perform	a	TE	means	to	successfully	“live	through”	the	anticipatory	horizons	against	the	 background	 of	 which	 fulfilled	 intentions	 towards	 particular	 phases	 of	 the	imaginative	process	always	stand	out.	The	performance	stage	of	a	TE	is	completed	when																																																									13	Of	 course,	 in	 using	 this	 terminology,	 I	 take	 a	 cue	 from	 Daniel	 Dennett	 who	 famously	 dubbed	 TEs	“intuition	pumps”.	However,	my	agreement	with	Dennett’s	views	is	rather	superficial.	While	I	agree	that	the	hallmark	of	a	well-functioning	TE	 is	 that	 it	 is	“cunningly	designed	to	 focus	 the	reader’s	attention	on	‘the	important’	features,	and	to	deflect	the	reader	from	bogging	down	in	hard-to-follow	details”	(Dennett	1984,	12),	I	do	not	share	the	dismissive	attitude	that	is	characteristic	for	Dennett’s	early	takes	on	TEs.	
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we	 reach	 that	 state	 of	 the	 TE-scenario	 which	 the	 presenter	 deems	 relevant	 for	 the	projected	 target-thesis.	 Like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 physical	 experiments,	 we	 can	 now	 ask	whether	 the	 outcome	of	 the	TE	 supports	 the	 conclusion	 that	 its	 presenter	 draws.	 For	instance:	 Do	 the	 changing	 states	 of	 a	 water-bucket-system	 in	 an	 otherwise	 empty	universe	really	force	us	to	accept	the	existence	of	absolute	space?	Does	a	light	ray	that	enters	an	elevator	horizontally	 really	 force	us	 to	accept	 that	 the	effects	of	 gravity	and	inertial	acceleration	are	indistinguishable?		But	 scrutinizing	 the	 relation	between	 the	outcome	of	 the	 imaginative	process	 and	 the	projected	target	thesis	is	not	all	that	happens	at	the	conclusion	stage.	In	many	cases	it	is	also	 natural	 to	 reflect	 on	 whether	 the	 course	 of	 the	 imaginative	 process	 itself	 was	inevitable,	 independently	 from	 its	 purported	 impact	 on	 the	 target	 thesis.	 Here	 is	 an	example	that	might	illustrate	the	point:	Consider	a	modern	version	of	Galileo’s	tower-TE	in	which	we	 imagine	a	cannon	ball	 that	 is	 tied	 to	a	musket	ball.	We	are	 then	asked	 to	throw	the	combined	system	from	a	tower	and	to	see	what	happens.	If	the	speed	of	fall	of	bodies	 is	really	proportional	 to	 their	weights,	as	 the	Aristotelian	 theory	suggests,	 then	the	combined	system	will	fall	faster	and	slower.	This	outcome	is	usually	taken	to	show	that	the	Aristotelian	law	of	falling	bodies	is	false	and	must	be	replaced	with	Galileo’s.		Now,	critical	reflection	on	this	TE	can	occur	on	two	different	levels:14	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	natural	to	wonder	whether	both	conclusions	–	the	rejection	of	the	Aristotelian	law	and	the	 proclamation	 of	 the	 Galilean	 law	 –	 are	 equally	 supported	 by	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	imaginative	 process.	 Yet,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 ask	 whether	 the	outcome	 itself	 is	 inevitable.	 Is	 it	 really	 the	 case	 that	 the	 anticipations	 in	 this	 TE	unavoidably	lead	us	to	two	conflicting	scenarios	in	which	the	combined	system	falls	both	faster	and	slower?	Or	do	our	 anticipations	 vary	depending	on	how	 tightly	 the	musket	ball	and	the	cannon	ball	are	connected?	Do	our	anticipations	vary	depending	on	whether	the	two	objects	are	connected	with	a	rope	or	with	a	rubber	band?	Can	a	cannon	ball	that	is	 connected	 with	 a	 musket	 ball	 really	 be	 treated	 as	 one	 object,	 as	 the	 TE	 seems	 to	presuppose	 (cf.,	 for	 versions	 of	 these	 and	 similar	 other	 objections,	 Koyré	 1968,	 51;	Gendler	1998,	404-406)?	Such	questions	obviously	do	not	concern	the	relation	between	the	 outcome	 of	 TE-process	 and	 the	 projected	 target	 thesis.	 Rather,	 such	 questions	concern	the	TE-process	itself.		How	 can	 questions	 concerning	 the	 inevitability	 of	 the	 TE-process	 be	 resolved?	 Given	what	 has	 been	 said	 so	 far,	 an	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 goes	 along	 the	 following	 lines:	Since	the	evolution	of	a	TE-setup	is	determined	by	the	rules	of	anticipation	that	govern	the	 TE,	 scrutinizing	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 TE-process	 can	 only	 proceed	 by	 way	 of	explicating	 the	 background	 knowledge	 that	 initially	 motivated	 the	 relevant	 rules	 of	anticipation.	During	the	performance	stage,	i.e.	during	the	process	of	“living	through”	the	horizons	 in	which	 the	phases	of	 the	TE	are	given,	 this	background	knowledge	 is	 tacit.	However,	 if	we	wish	to	critically	reflect	on	the	strength	with	which	the	outcome	of	the	TE-process	imposes	itself	on	us,	the	relevant	parts	of	our	background	knowledge	must	
																																																								14	The	 two	 levels	 I	am	referring	 to	here	 resemble	Brown’s	distinction	between	experiment	 in	 the	broad	sense	and	experiment	in	the	narrow	sense:	“In	the	narrow	sense,	an	experiment	includes	the	set	up	and	the	 observation	 […].	 In	 the	 broad	 sense,	 the	 experiment	 includes	 background	 assumptions	 and	 initial	theorizing,	 the	 setup,	 observation,	 additional	 theorizing,	 calculating,	 and	 drawing	 the	 final	 conclusion.”	(Brown	2007,	157-158)	What	I	call	the	level	of	the	TE-process	is	roughly	similar	to	Brown’s	experiment	in	the	narrow	sense.	
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be	 made	 explicit.15	The	 strength	 with	 which	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 particular	 TE-process	imposes	 itself	 on	 us	 will	 depend,	 among	 other	 factors,	 on	 the	 type	 of	 background	knowledge	that	motivates	the	relevant	rules	of	anticipation:	If,	for	instance,	a	particular	set	 of	 anticipations	 is	motivated	by	 a	 theory	 that	 operates	 in	 the	background	of	 a	TE,	then	 the	 degree	 to	which	we	 accept	 the	 outcome	of	 the	TE	depends	 on	 the	 degree	 of	belief	 in	 the	 underlying	 theory.	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 anticipations	turns	 out	 to	 be	 determined	 by	 an	 essential	 law,	 then	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 imaginative	process	will	be	regarded	as	necessary.		Let	 me	 conclude	 this	 section	 by	 briefly	 commenting	 on	 one	 last	 issue:	 On	 the	 view	proposed	here,	to	perform	a	TE	is	to	“live	through”	the	rules	of	anticipation	that	are	co-given	 at	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 imaginative	 process.	 These	 rules	 are	 motivated	 by	 the	background	knowledge	 that	 is	 triggered	during	 the	preparatory	 stage,	 i.e.	 through	 the	concepts	 of	 which	 the	 TE-narrative	 is	 composed.	 Hence,	 the	 course	 as	 well	 as	 the	outcome	 of	 a	 TE	 is	 ultimately	 determined	 by	 chunks	 of	 pre-established	 background	knowledge.	But	this	raises	an	obvious	question:	How	can	we	learn	something	new	from	TEs	 if	 their	 outcome	 is	determined	by	background	knowledge	 that	must	 already	have	been	 acquired	 before	 the	 TE	 can	 even	 be	 set	 up?	 Isn’t	 it	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 view	defended	here	 that	 the	performance	of	a	TE	 is	 the	mere	recalling	of	what	was	already	known?		Since	scientific	TEs	are	a	very	diverse	 lot,	 it	 is,	 I	 think,	 impossible	 to	give	a	principled	answer	to	how	TEs	manage	to	go	beyond	the	knowledge	one	already	has	to	possess	in	order	to	perform	the	TE.	It	is	thus	mainly	for	the	sake	of	brevity	that	I	will	reduce	myself	to	one	single	aspect	that	seems	to	be	of	particular	importance	in	this	context:	As	I	have	pointed	out,	TEs	require	us	to	immerse	ourselves	into	quasi-worlds	that	differ	from	the	actual	 world	 in	 more	 or	 less	 drastic	 ways.	 One	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 immersion	 is	epistemically	 significant	 is	 that	 it	 gives	 us	 the	 opportunity	 to	 test	 our	 background	knowledge	under	conditions	that	could	not	be	replicated	otherwise.	Of	course,	there	is	also	a	danger	in	projecting	quasi-worlds	that	are	far	removed	from	the	actual	world:	The	more	outlandish	 the	quasi-world,	 the	higher	 the	 risk	 that	our	 anticipations	 eventually	become	ungrounded.	But	one	of	the	things	a	well-designed	TE	accomplishes	by	way	of	projecting	 idealized	 quasi-worlds	 is	 to	 provoke	 collisions	 between	 parts	 of	 our	background	knowledge	that	would	not	even	come	close	under	normal	circumstances.16	It	is	in	this	way	that	TEs	allow	us	to	detect	and	get	rid	of	inconsistencies	in	our	existing	background	knowledge,	 to	explicate	and	scrutinize	background	assumptions	that	were	previously	 left	 unquestioned	 and,	 in	 some	 particularly	 impressive	 cases,	 even	 to	
																																																								15	It	 should	be	noted,	however,	 that	 the	explication	of	 tacit	background	knowledge	usually	comes	at	 the	price	of	diminishing	the	cognitive	efficacy	and	elegance	of	a	given	TE.	This	point	has	been	emphasized	by	David	Gooding	(1992,	286).		16	An	example	might	help	make	 this	point	more	vivid.	As	noted	earlier	 (cf.	 footnote	6),	 our	background	image	 of	 the	 world	 is	 in	 part	 composed	 of	 pieces	 of	 non-propositional,	 practical	 and	 sensorimotor	knowledge	about	how	things	are	done	and	how	we	use	our	bodies	to	do	them.	At	 first	blush,	one	might	think	that,	since	TEs	are	performed	in	the	laboratory	of	the	mind,	implicit	sensorimotor	and	kinaesthetic	knowledge	is	irrelevant	for	the	practice	of	TE-reasoning.	However,	as	Gooding	(1992)	and	Yiftach	Fehige	and	 I	 (2013)	have	argued,	 this	 is	 far	 from	being	 the	case.	While	Gooding	employs	a	broadly	naturalistic	framework	 to	 make	 this	 point,	 Fehige	 and	 I	 have	 approached	 the	 issue	 from	 a	 phenomenological	perspective.	 The	 aim	 of	 our	 paper	 was	 to	 a)	 show	 that	 implicit	 body	 knowledge	 is	 operative	 in	many	instances	of	TE-reasoning	and	to	b)	illustrate	this	claim	by	means	of	an	analysis	of	Newton’s	bucket-TE.		
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reconfigure	 the	conceptual	apparatus	with	which	we	approach	the	world	(Kuhn	1977;	Gendler	1998).		
6. Concluding	Remarks		The	goal	of	this	paper	was	to	set	out	some	basic	directions	in	which	a	phenomenological	framework	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 scientific	 TEs	 should	 be	 developed.	 On	 my	 view,	phenomenology	differs	from	the	existing	approaches,	among	other	things,	in	its	starting	point:	 The	main	 objective,	 at	 least	 initially,	 is	 not	 to	 construct	 a	 theory	 that	 seeks	 to	bring	 TEs	 in	 line	 with	 certain	 pre-established	 epistemological,	 ontological	 and	metaphysical	views.	The	main	objective	of	a	phenomenological	account	is	rather	to	give	a	 faithful	description	of	 the	actual	performance	 of	TEs	 from	a	 first-person	perspective	and	to	go	on	from	there.	One	of	the	aims	in	the	preceding	sections	was	to	indicate	how	such	 a	 description	might	 actually	 look	 like.	 But,	 of	 course,	much	work	 remains	 to	 be	done	in	order	to	position	phenomenology	as	a	serious	contender	in	the	ongoing	debate	on	TEs.17		
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